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1. INTRODUCTION
The global trend in the world economy is that an increasing number of economies 
engage in trade liberalisation. This liberalisation can be unilateral, but it is usu-
ally a product of co-operation between economies. Countries tend to exchange 
trade concessions on all levels: bilateral, regional, and multilateral. However, 
until multilateral liberalisation is achieved, in cases when a WTO round of trade 
negotiation is not heading towards a foreseeable closure, more and more coun-
tries turn to regional trade integration. Focusing on Europe, all Central and East-
ern European (CEE) countries as well as Western Balkan (WB) countries have a 
strategic goal of joining the European Union. The whole EU enlargement process 
implies a series of formal steps formulated in association agreements with signifi-
cant variations in trade regime during this process, preceded by the fulfilment of 
economic and political requirements.
The fact is that the CEE countries are at a lower level of global competitiveness 
than the core EU member countries (EU-15). The general view is that any type 
of trade liberalisation leads to market opening and produces greater benefits for 
the more developed partners. That is the reason why the EU grants asymmetrical 
trade concessions in the accession process. As CEE received this non-reciprocal 
treatment in trade with the EU, countries of the Western Balkans were granted 
similar trade regime by EU unilateral trade measures (Autonomous Trade Meas-
ures, ATMs). Later on, as acceding countries move closer to the EU membership, 
their trade regime with the EU becomes more symmetrical, as stipulated by the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) for WB countries.
The EU acceding countries are encouraged by the EU members to liberal-
ise their intra-regional trade, leading to the creation of regional free-trade areas, 
such as the former Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) for CEE 
countries and CEFTA 2006 for WB countries. Most of the empirical papers dedi-
cated to the effects of EU enlargement on bilateral trade have considered the CEE 
countries in the period before or right after they became EU members. However, 
there are a few papers dealing with the effects of SAA and CEFTA 2006 on 
the bilateral trade of WB countries and they are usually focused on the period 
preceding the full application of CEFTA 2006 (for instance, Montanari 2005; 
Herderschee – Qiao 2007; Begović 2011). To the best of our knowledge, none of 
the papers analyses the period after the application of CEFTA 2006 and compares 
bilateral trade effects for CEE and WB countries. Therefore, based on the latest 
data, the analysis in this paper is focused simultaneously on the bilateral exports 
of two groups of EU accession countries: CEE and WB economies, at different 
stages of the EU accession process.
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The main question that arises, and which is in the focus of this paper, is to 
what extent variations in trade regime towards the EU have positive effects on 
the bilateral trade of observed countries in the EU accession process. In case 
of CEE countries, we investigated whether the completion of trade integration 
with joining the EU leads to further increase in their bilateral exports to the EU-
15. Since CEE (new EU member) countries were at a similar level of economic 
development in the recent past as WB countries are now, observing the CEE ex-
port patterns could help us perceive expected tendencies in WB bilateral exports 
on their road towards the EU membership. During the EU accession process, the 
acceding countries experienced variations in trade regimes, from asymmetric 
trade preferences towards reciprocity in trade relations. Hence, another impor-
tant issue in the paper refers to the effects of ATMs and SAA on the WB trade. 
Finally, we encompass the effects of trade regimes on bilateral exports to non-
EU markets in countries under observation, especially on intra-regional trade 
of acceding countries. In this section, the paper builds on our previous research 
where we explored the effects of CEFTA 2006 trade preferences (Dragutinović-
Mitrović – Bjelić 2012).
To answer these questions, the gravity panel data model is used in estimating 
bilateral exports from the WB and CEE countries to the EU-15 in the 2001–2010 
period. The results of our empirical analysis suggest several important conclu-
sions: First, the EU membership plays an important role in enhancing bilateral 
exports of countries in our sample; second, asymmetrical trade preferences grant-
ed to acceding countries during the EU accession process are significant in boost-
ing the bilateral exports of WB countries but later variations in the trade regime 
introduced by SAA are not significant; third, the CEFTA 2006 integration effect 
represents the most important factor in promoting intra-regional WB trade.
The paper is organised as follows: After the introduction, an empirical litera-
ture overview, relevant for our empirical analysis, is presented in Section 2. The 
background of the enlargement process and accompanying agreements as well as 
a short description of the dynamics of WB and CEE exports are given in Section 
3. The model, data and methodology used in empirical analysis are presented in 
Section 4. Estimation results are contained in Section 5, followed by main con-
clusions in Section 6.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
A commonly used empirical tool for modelling trade integration effects on bilat-
eral trade between countries is the gravity model. Its usage in international trade 
dates back to the 1960s. The original model relies on Newton’s law of universal 
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gravitation in explaining bilateral trade flows between countries by their “eco-
nomic masses” (measured by their GDP and population) and geographical dis-
tance between their economic centres (Linnemann 1966). Different empirical 
specifications of this model have been developed in the literature, and its aug-
mented forms usually contain various trade promoting factors and trade barri-
ers such as common language, common border, free trade agreements, currency 
union membership, etc. Parallel to the development of empirical specifications, 
the theoretical foundations for the gravity model are also researched, resulting 
in theoretical explanations based on international trade theories (e.g. Helpman 
1987; Bergstrand 1989; Deardorff 1998; Anderson – van Wincoop 2003). Af-
ter the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the model has been extensively used 
in predicting bilateral trade flows between the Western European countries and 
newly established countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (e.g. Wang – 
Winters 1992; Baldwin 1994; Nillson 2000). 
In the recent literature, instead of estimation of trade potentials, the gravity mod-
el is predominantly used to measure the contribution of currency unions, free trade 
areas (FTAs), economic integrations, and the effects of various trade-related policies 
or exchange rate volatility on bilateral trade flows (e.g. Micco et al. 2003; Faruqee 
2004; Papazoglou et al. 2006; Baier – Bergstrand 2007; Bussiere et al. 2008). Usu-
ally, authors have distinguished two levels of trade integrations: free trade areas and 
customs unions, as a higher level of integration. At one point, too large a number 
of bilateral FTAs made their administration too complicated, a phenomenon which 
is usually referred to as “spaghetti bowl” (Bhagwati 2008), while some authors un-
derline the superiority of customs unions (Herderschee – Qiao 2007). Recent litera-
ture is more focused on the trade effects of monetary unions.1 The general finding 
of the analyses focused on the European monetary union (EMU) is that EMU has a 
noticeable impact on intra-regional trade even at this early stage, and the effects on 
the currency union, depending on a sample or methodology, are estimated to range 
between 5% and 20% (Micco et al. 2003; Faruqee 2004).
The estimation of trade effects of FTAs has also been usually conducted in the 
empirical literature on gravity models. The literature suggests that these effects on 
trade between two countries should be positive as a result of relaxed (elimination 
of) various trade barriers. However, results from empirical literature, which are 
based on cross-sectional data, have been mixed. Baier – Bergstrand (2007) find 
that the treatment of FTAs as an exogenous variable is the main reason for mixed 
empirical results obtained in the earlier literature, resulting in biased downward 
estimates. The estimation results of their gravity panel data model indicates that 
1  There are some findings in the literature that bilateral trade is tripled between trade partners 
belonging to a currency union (Frankel – Rose 2002).
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if the endogeneity of FTAs is taken into account, then, on average, the bilateral 
trade of two members will double in 10 years. The treatment of FTAs as endog-
enous is explained by the fact that unobserved time-invariant bilateral factors 
(such as various policy-related barriers), which are not explicitly included in the 
model, may be correlated with the FTA variable (Baier – Bergstrand 2007). 
Many empirical papers have used the gravity model to examine the effects of 
exchange rates on bilateral trade flows (among the first authors was Bergstrand 
1989).2 Trade theory suggests that any devaluation (depreciation) of the national 
currency can have a positive effect on the rise in domestic country competitive-
ness on international markets, resulting in the increase of its exports. The latest 
studies devote more attention to the trade effects of exchange rate volatility (e.g. 
Fidrmuc – Horváth 2007), and some of them have shown that it has a limited effect 
on aggregate trade, while it tends to reduce bilateral trade (Clark et al. 2004).
As regards the literature on the Western Balkan countries, a large potential for 
growth in trade between them and the EU is found in Montanari (2005). How-
ever, the effects of asymmetrical trade preferences, granted by the EU unilaterally 
to Romania and Bulgaria, and later to other WB economies, have appeared to be 
the most significant factor, which sometimes causes actual trade to rise beyond 
trade potentials. Other investigations point out that CEFTA 2006, as a preparatory 
integration for future EU membership of the WB countries, should also have a 
significant effect on their intra-regional trade, but without danger of trade being 
diverted from trade with the EU (Herderschee – Qiao 2007). However, this state-
ment has not been empirically validated in the literature so far, and this important 
issue will be addressed in the following sections of this paper.
3. EU ENLARGEMENT PROCESS AND TRADE REGIMES
At the beginning, EU agreements envisaged asymmetry in trade relations, but the 
final goal was the creation of free trade area between signatories, with the gradu-
al introduction of symmetry in the transitory period. Stimulated by the EU, CEE 
states also started to co-operate intra-regionally through CEFTA, which regulated 
the intra-regional trade of its signatories, creating a free trade area for industrial 
goods.3 Upon joining the EU4, all CEE countries became part of the EU Customs 
2  Usually, researchers use real exchange rate to explore its influence on bilateral exports (Mar-
tinez –Zarzoso; Nowak – Lehmann 2003).
3  Also, the three Baltic countries concluded the Baltic Free Trade Agreement (BAFTA) in 
1993. 
4  In 2004, the new EU members were Cyprus, Malta and CEE countries (Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia), and Romania and Bulgaria in 2007.
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Union and their membership in CEFTA was terminated. As EU members, CEE 
countries follow the Common Trade Policy, resulting in the termination of all pre-
vious trade agreements with third countries. But there were some limitations of 
the membership rights of these new EU members, such as limitations in the free 
movement of labour, of access to subsidies and such, which kept them from fully 
integrating with the EU internal market. Even though the tariffs were abolished in 
trade with the EU, goods from new member countries did not easily find their way 
to the EU single market (Chevassus-Lozza et al. 2008). The reason was that CEE 
exports were faced with significant non-tariff barriers introduced by the EU.5 
The accession of the Western Balkans6 to the EU is a slightly different proc-
ess, since EU designed a new type of accession agreements, the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements (SAA). These agreements are different from the Europe 
agreements in the part where the EU insists more on the fulfilment of certain 
political conditions. Before SAA, in 2000, the EU had adopted unilateral trade 
measures, the so-called Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs),7 which granted the 
WB countries tariff free and quota free access to the EU single market for almost 
all export products from this region, except for sugar, textiles, and certain kinds 
of meat, fish and wine. The ATMs are nonreciprocal and asymmetrical in favour 
of the Western Balkans, which was not obliged to reciprocate by granting trade 
preferences to the EU (Bjelić – Dragutinović-Mitrović 2012). With the signing 
of SAA, the reciprocity in trade with the EU is introduced, slowly opening the 
WB markets to the EU goods, in the transitory period of usually 6 years.8 As 
for the original CEFTA, an important precondition for the WB countries for EU 
membership is the development of regional co-operation in the Western Balkans. 
The first step was the signing of 32 bilateral trade agreements between the WB 
countries, which have been in force as of 2003. However, since the network of 
bilateral trade agreements was too complicated to administer, the WB economies 
made a single trade agreement, the so-called CEFTA 2006, adopted in 2006 and 
entering into force in 2007.9
5  Increase of non-tariff barriers was probably meant to replace the decrease in tariffs, because 
even a small increase of these non-tariff barriers significantly reduces exports (Damijan et al. 
2006).
6  These countries include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, 
Serbia, and Kosovo, as a separate customs territory under UNSCR 1244.
7  EC 2007/2000/EC.
8  Council Regulation (UE) N° 1336/2011 of 13 December 2011, Official Journal of the Ecs, L 
347, 30.12.2011, p.1. 
9  CEFTA-2006 signatories are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Mac-
edonia, Moldova, Serbia, and Kosovo (a separate customs territory under UNSCR 1244 and 
ICJ Opinion). The original signatories of CEFTA 2006 were also Romania and Bulgaria, but 
they left CEFTA in 2007 before full application, when they became EU members.
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Trade liberalisation and regional trade agreements are expected to have an over-
all positive effect on the bilateral trade flows of countries. However, this may not 
be a universal finding, particularly for developing countries such as the WB coun-
tries. Political and historical circumstances specific to the WB region may be fac-
tors which diminish the expected positive effects of SAA and CEFTA 2006. In the 
period under observation, the SAA came into force in three out of five WB coun-
tries (the FYR Macedonia in 2004, Croatia in 2005, and Albania in 2009). How-
ever, with the implemented SAA, the SAA benefits do not seem to significantly 
reflect either on the dynamics of the WB bilateral exports to the EU-15 (Figure 1), 
or on its dynamics in each of the three countries. This may be due to the fact that 
positive effects of trade liberalisation on the WB bilateral exports were achieved 
even before the SAA implementation through ATMs, which granted asymmetrical 
trade preferences to the WB economies (Dragutinović-Mitrović – Bjelić 2012). 
On the other hand, one could notice a growing tendency of intra-regional WB 
trade in the implementation period of CEFTA 2006 (Figure 1).10 Such dynamics 
of exports could be a direct result of CEFTA 2006 trade preferences, but also a 
consequence of the depreciation of some of WB currencies, implying the impor-
tance of price competitiveness in determining their bilateral trade.
10  Due to the global crisis, a standstill in the growing dynamics appeared in the last two years not 
only in the WB countries, but also in all other countries under observation.
Figure 1. WB exports to EU-15 and intra-regional WB exports (Indices, 2006 = 100)
Source: Authors’ calculation based on UN Comtrade database.
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In the same period, CEE countries passed through all stages of the EU as-
sociation process and became EU members. According to the export dynamics 
of CEE7, i.e. former CEFTA countries (Figure 2), it is evident that their intra-
regional exports grew faster in the years following the EU accession, but that the 
trend in their bilateral exports toward the EU-15 has not changed compared to the 
period prior to their EU membership.
The overview presented above raises the research question of this paper: to 
what extent variations in trade regimes in the EU enlargement process, defined 
by different intra-regional and extra-regional trade agreements, determine the dy-
namics of WB and CEE bilateral exports. When considering this general ques-
tion, three specific questions are addressed. The first is to find out whether the 
completion of trade integration into the EU leads to further increase of bilateral 
exports to the EU. The answer should help perceive expected patterns in WB 
bilateral exports in their EU accession process. The second question refers to 
the comparison of the contribution of asymmetric trade preferences in the EU 
integration process (ATMs) to the effects of later implemented EU accession 
agreements (SAA), which introduced symmetry. The third question is related to 
the direction of bilateral exports of observed countries to non-EU markets like 
CEFTA 2006 and countries with FTAs. The intra-regional trade in CEFTA 2006 
is important for the bilateral trade flows of member countries. Since exports of 
Figure 2. CEE7 exports to EU-15 and intra-regional CEE7 exports (Indices, 2004 = 100)
Note: CEE7 (former CEFTA) countries are Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania 
and Bulgaria.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on UN Comtrade database.
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WB and CEE countries were partly governed by bilateral FTAs before multilat-
eral arrangements (CEFTA 2006, EU), we set out to estimate the effects of these 
“spaghetti bowl” regimes. The answers will be offered in Section 5, based on the 
results of the gravity model estimation.
4. MODEL, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY
The gravity model is estimated on the basis of bilateral export flows from CEE 
and WB countries to EU-15 and their intra-regional exports as well. The sample 
contains 430 country-pairs observed for 2001–2010, which in total gives 4,300 
panel observations.11 The following augmentative form of gravity model is estimated:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6ln ln ln lnijt ijt ijt ijt ij ij ijtX TGDP SIM RFE D Border FTAβ β β β β β β       
7 8 9 10 11 127 7 _ 04ijt ijt ijt ijt ij ijtATM SAA CEFTA EU CEE CEEβ β β β β β        
 
                                                                             13 ln .ijt ij t ijtRER uβ μ λ    (1)
First, the three right-hand variables of gravity model (1) are used in an at-
tempt to investigate the effects of theory-based factors on trade flows of CEE 
and WB countries. The theory suggests that the higher level of the overall GDP 
of two countries (TGDP) increases bilateral trade between them, and that more 
similar countries in terms of their SIM/GDP12 tend to have higher intra-industry 
trade (for instance, Helpman 1987, or Egger 2002). Furthermore, according to the 
H-O-S trade model, international trade is explained by comparative advantages 
based on differences in relative factor endowments (RFE). Contrary to this, the 
Linder hypothesis indicates that the closer countries in terms of their per capi-
ta incomes are, the larger the intra-industry trade between them. The empirical 
litera ture also suggests this specification for modelling bilateral trade of devel-
oped, mostly OECD countries, while there is no clear support for its usage in the 
case of less developed countries (Debaere 2005). Since a small part of exporters 
11  CEE: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. WB: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, and 
Serbia. Due to the lack of data on bilateral exports, the following country pairs were dropped 
from the analysis: Albania–Luxemburg, Albania–Latvia, Albania–Lithuania, FYR Macedo-
nia–Luxemburg, FYR Macedonia–Latvia, Bosnia and Herzegovina–Latvia. The choice of 
2001 as the first year of the observed period was predetermined by the availability of data for 
all considered variables.
12 System of Integrated Models/Global Development Processes.
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in our sample are OECD members, an interesting question is whether observed 
trade flows are characterised by the dominance of inter-industry or intra-industry 
trade. In other words, the issue is to test whether CEE and WB countries’ bilateral 
trade flows are based on comparative advantages resulting from differences in 
RFE, or whether the Linder hypothesis holds.
Dependent variable Xijt in model (1) represents trade flow from country i to 
country j in the year t, while its determinants are defined as follows: 
 TGDPijt – the overall GDP of two trading partners in year t, i.e. the sum 
of GDP of exporter country (GDPit) and importer country (GDPjt) which 
should positively affect bilateral trade. 
  2 21 ( ) ( )jtitijt
it jt it jt
GDPGDPSIM
GDP GDP GDP GDP
    – the similarity of trading
     partners (i) and importer (j) country in the year t, in terms of their GDP. It can 
take value from 0 (absolute divergence in size) to 0.5 (equal country size) 
and captures the intra-industry trade patterns between similar countries.
  ln ln jtitijt
it jt
GDPGDPRFE
POP POP
  – the difference in relative factor endowments,
  proxied by absolute value of the difference between GDP per capita of coun-
tries i and j (POPit and POPjt are population in countries i and j). The RFE 
variable takes minimal (zero) value for countries with identical relative fac-
tor endowments. Following trade theories, a larger difference in relative fac-
tor endowments is expected to decrease intra-industry trade share, and to 
increase inter-industry (and total) trade.
Geographical distance (Dij) between main economic centres of trading partners 
i and j is used as a proxy for transport and transaction costs, and should have a 
negative influence on the bilateral trade. Border is a dummy variable which takes 
the value 1 for countries that share common border and 0 otherwise. It is expected 
that common border promotes exports between countries.
Since our sample period 2001–2010 also includes sub-period in which FTAs’ 
effects could be observed, we cover the bilateral trade effects of FTAs by a rel-
evant dummy variable (FTA). The additional effects of trade liberalisation in the 
EU enlargement process and in intra-regional bilateral trade of accession coun-
tries are captured by two sets of dummy variables. The first set is related to WB 
countries:
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 The effects of asymmetric trade preferences granted by the EU for the bilat-
eral trade of WB countries are captured by dummy variable ATM. The vari-
able takes the value 1 for the period of ATMs’ validity for the observed WB 
country (period before SAA entered into force) and 0 otherwise.
 The effects of the Stabilization and Association Agreement on WB exports 
to the EU is evaluated by variable SAA, which takes the value 1 for the pe-
riod from SAA entering into force: from 2004 for Macedonia, from 2005 for 
Croatia, from 2009 for Albania onwards, and 0 otherwise.13 
 Dummy variable CEFTA is created to measure the effects of the CEFTA 
agreement adopted in 2006, on bilateral export flows of its signatories. 
Since the application of CEFTA started in 2007, this variable assumes the 
value 1 from 2007 onwards if both countries are CEFTA 2006 members, and 
0 otherwise. Both variables are expected to have significant positive effects 
on the WB bilateral exports.
 
For CEE countries, the second set of dummy variables is introduced:
 The EU dummy variable, which encompasses the effect of the EU integra-
tion on bilateral exports of CEE countries. This variable takes the value 1 
from the period of CEE accession to the EU: from 2004 for the Czech Re-
public, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
from 2007 for Bulgaria and Romania, and 0 otherwise. The effect of joining 
the EU is expected to be positive for their trade with EU-15 since their be-
coming a member of the single EU market removed all other trade barriers. 
 The level of intra-regional bilateral export flows among CEE7, former 
CEFTA members, in the observed period is captured by dummy variable 
CEE7, whereas the effect of joining the EU on their intra-regional trade is 
covered by dummy variable CEE7_04.
To encompass the effects of depreciation of the exporter’s currency on its exports, 
variable RERijt, which represents real bilateral exchange rate, is introduced in the 
form of:
                                   
jt
ijt ijt
it
CPI
RER NER
CPI
  , (2)
where NERijt represents nominal bilateral exchange rate of country i (the local 
currency value of 1 unit of importer j currency), while CPIit and CPIjt are con-
sumer price indices of exporter and importer countries i and j in the year t (base 
13  The effects of SAA for Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be analysed in the observed 
period, since they are still not in force.
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year, 2005). Variable RERijt is obtained as NERijt multiplied by the importer coun-
try’s CPIjt and divided by CPIit of the exporter country. Real exchange rate de-
fined in such a way is expected to have a positive regression coefficient, meaning 
that depreciation of the exporter’s currency could make domestic goods price 
competitive on foreign markets, leading to its higher foreign demand and the 
increase of its bilateral exports. In this way, we try to clarify the contribution of 
domestic currency depreciation to bilateral trade dynamics in comparison to the 
trade regimes effects.
Model (1) is in the form of a two-way panel data model with bilateral (country-
pair) specific effects μij and time effects t, while the term uijt is the remainder 
disturbance. In controlling both bilateral and time specific effects, our panel data 
set allows having greater flexibility in modelling differences in behaviour across 
country-pairs and over time. Bilateral effects capture the heterogeneity across 
country-pairs due to omitted variables specific to trading partners such as cul-
tural, historical, and other time-invariant factors. Time effects capture the effects 
of omitted time-varying factors (invariant across country-pairs) on bilateral trade 
and reflect common shocks or the overall trend towards globalisation (Bussiere 
et al. 2008).
In constructing gravity model variables, the following sources are used. Data 
on bilateral export flows in current million USD are taken from the UN Comtrade 
database for most countries, while the data for Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR 
Macedonia and Albania are used from UNCTAD database. Data on GDP, GDP 
per capita in current million USD, and GDP deflators are used from the IMF 
World Economic Outlook database. Real GDP and GDP per capita variables are 
constructed based on GDP deflator indices, with 2005 as the base year. Data on 
geographical distance between economic centres of two countries are from the 
website www.worldatlas.com. In defining FTA variable, we used a list of bilateral 
free trade agreements given in Herderschee – Quiao (2007) in Appendix Table 
I.3–I.4. Since this source only contains information on FTAs up to 2005, and not 
for all WB countries, we also used the list of bilateral agreements in WB speci-
fied in the CEFTA 2006 agreement.14 Information on agreements in relation to 
the EU and CEFTA integrations (ATMs and SAA) is obtained from the European 
Commission website as well as the CEFTA 2006 website. Finally, the UNCTAD 
database is a source of data on bilateral nominal exchange rates, while data on 
consumer price indices (2005 = 100) come from the IMF database.
Bearing in mind the advantages of panel data approach over the cross-section 
methodology, taking into account the bilateral (exporter and importer) heteroge-
14  The final articles of the CEFTA 2006 Agreement contain the list of bilateral agreements, with 
the information on their entry into force.
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neity, in choosing the estimation method of gravity model we followed the em-
pirical literature on panel data. Various panel data techniques are used in the lit-
erature to estimate the gravity model. Many of them used within-group estimator 
for one-way or two-way fixed effects (FE) model, error components generalised 
least square estimator (EC-GLS) for random effects (RE) model, Hausman-Tay-
lor instrumental variable method (Egger 2002; Cheng – Wall 2005; Serlenga – 
Shin 2007; Bussiere et al. 2008). Furthermore, the Poisson fixed effects method 
and the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood method have been used as solutions 
for zero trade flows problem (for instance, Silva – Tenreyro 2006, or Westerlund 
– Wilhelmsson 2011).15
Looking at the estimation methods of gravity models in the empirical literature, 
it seems that its choice mostly depends on econometric problems, the purpose of 
the analysis, the sample of countries, and the observed period. For instance, the 
use of a within-group estimator is often recommended for capturing bilateral spe-
cific effects and avoiding bias estimates due to correlation between regressors 
and bilateral effects (Bussiere et al. 2008, etc.). Also, FE specification is proposed 
when the analysis is focused on the estimation of typical trade flows between an 
ex ante predetermined selection of countries (Egger 2000). Since the choice of 
FE model raises the problem of the estimation of time-invariant variables in the 
gravity model, two solutions are often suggested in the literature: 
 Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable estimation of the RE model (Egger 
2002; Serlenga – Shin 2007), and 
 two-step estimation of the FE model (Martinez-Zarzoso – Nowak-Lehman 
2003; Cheng – Wall 2005; Bussiere et al. 2008). The second step in this two-
step procedure implies the estimation of an additional regression of bilateral 
(country-pair) effects on all time invariant explanatory variables. 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS
To select the appropriate estimation method for gravity model (1), we first analyse 
univariate characteristics of time-varying variables, i.e. their stationary property, 
and employ several panel unit root tests (Levin, Lin and Chu [LLC], Im, Pesaran 
and Shin [IPS] and Maddala-Wu Fisher-type tests). Most of the considered tests 
15  It is also worth noting that a few papers take into account possible non-stationarity in variables 
(Faruqee 2004; Fidrmuc 2009).
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reject the null hypothesis of unit root, implying that the observed variables are 
stationary (Table 1).16 This enables us to apply estimation methods for stationary 
panels.17
Table 1
Panel unit root test results
Variable LLC IPS – W statistics ADF Fisher
ln Xijt –19.5623  *** –5.9441*** –2.1901**
ln TGDP –15.0372*** –13.9387*** –2.9720**
ln SIM –12.7067*** –0.6634 –2.5476**
RFE –16.7439*** –3.8718*** –1.2774*
ln RER –26.8088*** –11.4319** –1.7752**
Notes: *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The number 
of lags included in the regression model is determined by the Akaike information criterion (AIC) as suitable 
criteria for a short time span. Deterministic components: bilateral effects included.
Heterogeneity across panels is accounted for by the estimation of the gravity 
model both in the form of fixed and random two-way effects specifications.18 
Bilateral specific effects in the FE model are captured by country-pairs dummy 
variables, while being treated as a component of the error term in the RE model. 
Time effects in both specifications are comprised by T–1 time dummy variables, 
i.e. they are treated as fixed.
Both tests for individual effects (F test for the FE model and Honda one-sided 
test for the RE model) imply that the bilateral effects are significant and have to 
be accounted for (Table 2). Furthermore, time effects should also be included 
in both specifications as it is confirmed by F test results. To make a choice be-
tween the FE and RE model, i.e. to check for correlation between the bilateral 
effects and regressors in the RE model (single endogeneity problem), we used 
the Hausman test robust to heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge 2002).19 The testing 
16  We also applied the Pesaran CADF test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels which takes 
into account potential cross-section dependence, but the results again imply the rejection of 
the null hypothesis that all series are non-stationary. 
17  All estimation and testing procedures are done in Stata/SE 11.2.
18  FE and RE specifications are estimated by within-group estimator and error-components gen-
eralised least squares (EC-GLS) estimator, respectively.
19  The reason for using the test is that although heterogeneity is captured by bilateral specific ef-
fects, the remainder disturbance may still suffer from heteroscedasticity and then the standard 
Hausman test is not valid.  
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result indicates a correlation between bilateral (country-pair) effects and some 
of the regressors in the RE model. Hence, RE estimates are biased, whereas FE 
estimates are consistent.
A further econometric problem accounted for is autocorrelation in the error 
term uijt of the FE model, as it produces inefficient estimates of the regression 
coefficients and biased standard errors, also leaving doubt about the Hausman 
test validity. The Bhargava-Franzini-Narendranathan (BFN) Durbin-Watson test 
Table 2
Gravity model – FE and RE estimation results
Dependent variable: ln Xijt
Variables (1) Fixed bilateral and 
time effects
(2) Random bilateral and 
fixed time effects
ln TGDP 0.906*** 1.928***  
ln SIM 0.920*** 1.076***  
RFE 0.569*** 0.173**   
ln D – –2.084***  
Border – 0.574**    
EU 0.147* 0.324***  
ATM 0.337*** 0.236***  
SAA 0.229** 0.130     
CEFTA 0.380*** 0.581***  
FTA 0.239*** 0.475***  
CEE7 – 0.359*     
CEE7_04 0.114 0.050     
ln RER 0.589*** –0.056
Constant –7.320*** –3.523***
R2 0.5875 0.7535
F test – individual effects 41.97  (0.000)
Honda test – random individual effects 86.27 (0.000)
Time effects – F test 34.01   (0.000) 214.64 (0.000)
Modified BFN–Durbin Watson test 1.14570
Baltagi–Li joint LM test 11326.67 (0.000)
LM test for serial correlation, assuming 
individual random effects
294.67 (0.000)
Hausman robust test 242.506 (0.000)
Notes: *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively (in parenthesis 
are p values). T–1 fixed time dummies are included in all specifications of gravity model. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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for the FE model indicates the presence of AR(1) in disturbances uijt.20 Hence, ac-
cording to Baltagi – Liu (2012), we applied the within-GLS estimator to estimate 
the FE AR(1) model, which uses the Prais–Winsten transformation to correct se-
rial correlation in the first step (Column (3), Table 3).21 
The FE AR(1) estimator, although consistent, does not provide for the direct 
estimation of the coefficients of time-invariant variables such as distance, border, 
and CEE7. If these variables are not correlated with individual effects, we can get 
consistent estimates of regression coefficients by applying the two-step procedure 
explained in the previous section. On the other hand, the Hausman-Taylor instru-
mental variable estimator, by allowing for the serial correlation of the AR(1) type 
in the remainder disturbances uijt (HT AR(1)), produces efficient estimates com-
pared to FE AR(1) estimates, provided that a set of proper instrumental variables 
exist (Egger 2002, Serlenga – Shin 2007, Baltagi – Liu 2012). Thus, we applied 
the HT AR(1) estimator on the gravity model. We experimented with several HT 
sets of instruments and checked which of them is valid by the Sargan–Hansen 
over-identification test robust to heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge 2002). As could 
be expected, the single endogeneity of the FTA variable is confirmed by testing 
results. According to the same test, it seems that TGDP and distance variables 
are also singly endogenous, i.e. important sources of correlation with bilateral ef-
fects. Following this result, the appropriate HT set of instruments is constructed 
and the HT AR(1) specification is estimated, with efficient estimates compared to 
consistent FE AR(1). Consequently, the main estimation results are summarised 
according to the HT AR(1) specification (last two columns in Table 3).
Concerning the effects of standard gravity model determinants, we can con-
clude that a significant positive relationship exists between the TGDP and SIM 
variables and bilateral trade flows. This coincides with both theoretical and em-
pirical findings that the similarity of trade partners (in terms of their GDP) and 
their overall GDP increase bilateral trade between them. The impact of differenc-
es in relative factor endowments (RFE) is also significantly positive: 1% increase 
of this difference leads to 0.529% increase in bilateral exports, meaning that trade 
flows between observed countries are based on comparative advantages. Contra-
ry to more developed countries mostly characterised by intra-industrial trade, this 
positive relation may imply that inter-industry trade dominates in the observed 
20  The same conclusion is derived for the RE model by both Baltagi–Li joint LM tests for first-
order serial correlation and individual effects, and the LM test for serial correlation assuming 
random individual effects (Table 2).
21  Following Egger (2002) and using the Prais–Winsten transformation, we also estimated the 
RE AR(1) model. However, the Hausman test again indicates a single endogeneity problem, 
so that the EC-GLS method produces biased estimates of RE AR(1) whereas FE AR(1) esti-
mates remain consistent.
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sample of countries, at a lower level of economic development than the core EU 
members. Hence, a larger difference in factor endowments increases the volume 
of inter-industry and total trade.
Distance as a proxy for transportation costs has a significant negative impact 
on bilateral flows, indicating lower bilateral exports along with greater distance 
between trade partners. The effect of the common border in HT AR(1) specifica-
tions is not significant. The reason for that may be that for most of the countries 
sharing the common border, this effect is compensated by intra-regional dummy 
variables.
Table 3
Gravity model – FE AR(1) and HT AR(1) estimation results
Dependent variable: ln Xijt
Variables (3) FE AR(1) (4) HT AR(1) (5) HT AR(1)
ln TGDP 0.844 *** 0 .906*** 0.763 ***
ln SIM 0.871 *** 0.833*** 0.718 ***
RFE 0.545 *** 0.529*** 0.492 ***
ln D – –2.031*** –2.124***
Border – –0.0084 –0.0056
EU 0.139** 0.154** 0.151***
ATM 0.161** 0.156** 0.131**
SAA 0.109 0.106 0.039
CEFTA 0.353*** 0.365*** 0.392***
FTA 0.214*** 0.225*** 0.202***
CEE7 – 0.674** 0.985 ***
CEE7_04 0.073 0.098* 0.139**
ln RER 0.176 ** 0.143** 0.125 **
wb_cee06 0.161**
wb_cee07 0.131*
wb_cee08 0.174**
wb_cee09 0.169**
wb_cee10 0.382***
cee_wb08 0.199***
cee_wb09 0.206**
cee_wb10 0.260***
Constant –1.331*** –1.200 *** –0.156**
R2 0.611 0.701 0.725
Sargan–Hansen 
overidentif. test
7.638 (0.571) 13.034 (0.264)
Notes: *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively (in parenthesis 
are p values). T–1 fixed time dummies are included in all specifications of gravity model. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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After controlling standard gravity variables, the effects of trade regime vari-
ables are considered. The most important change in trade regime is the EU mem-
bership that we estimate by the EU variable, measuring changes in CEE exports 
to the EU in the period from their formal joining the EU. Our analysis shows that 
the effect of EU integration on CEE bilateral exports is significant and positive, 
contributing to the additional increase of the new EU members’ exports to the 
EU-15. This contribution is about 16.6%, on average {[exp(0.154) – 1]100 = 
16.6%}. CEE7 countries, former CEFTA members, had significantly higher in-
tra-regional trade than the sample average in the whole observed period (signifi-
cant CEE7 dummy variable). Moreover, additional increase in their intra-regional 
trade is noted after their EU membership (measured by the CEE7_04 dummy), 
since a more liberal regime in their mutual trade is introduced in comparison to 
the liberalisation that they experienced through CEFTA.
A further issue concerns the comparison of the effects of asymmetrical trade 
preferences (captured by the ATM variable) to the effects of SAA on WB coun-
tries’ trade with the EU. The estimation results indicate that ATMs have signifi-
cantly stimulated their bilateral exports resulting in its increase by 16.9%, on 
average. However, additional liberalisation in the form of SAA does not seem 
to have contributed to the dynamics of their bilateral trade. The result also coin-
cides with an earlier finding that SAA do not show a strong impact on WB coun-
tries’ bilateral exports (Herderschee – Qiao 2007). This is possibly due to the fact 
that most of the trade benefits WB countries received through ATMs, whereas 
SAA did not further liberalise their exports, but rather WB imports. To analyse 
it deeper , we have added set of dummy variables reflecting changes in WB–EU 
trade relations (Column (5), Table 3).22 Results show that significant changes in 
WB exports toward CEE countries have occurred from 2006, which is due to 
the fact that most of the CEE countries, as new EU members, had to approve the 
application of ATMs in 2005. On the other hand, results also indicate that CEE 
exports toward WB countries have significantly increased from 2008, which is 
due to the adoption of SAA by CEE countries, as new EU members.
Further, CEFTA 2006 has a positive and significant contribution – increasing 
bilateral trade of its members by 44% {[exp(0.365) – 1]100 = 44%}. This is 
expected, since WB countries are traditional trade partners, they belonged to a 
common market of former Yugoslavia, and have cultural and language similari-
ties. The effects of non-EU trade regimes are controlled with the FTA dummy, 
which shows a positive and significant impact on bilateral trade flows of the 
observed countries: it increases two member countries’ trade by about 25.3%, on 
22  Column (5) in Table 3 contains only significant dummy variables for WB to CEE export flows 
and CEE to WB exports in several years.
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average {[exp(0.225) – 1]100 = 25.3%}. The estimated regression coefficient for 
real exchange rate as a proxy of price competitiveness is positive and significant. 
When controlling other gravity model variables, it appeared that 1% depreciation 
(devaluation) of the exporter’s currency increases its exports by 0.15%. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the effects of different trade regimes on bilateral trade of 
WB and CEE countries in the EU accession process from 2001 to 2010. The 
analysis corroborated our main hypothesis that along with significant effects of 
standard gravity model variables, trade regime variation in the EU accession 
process stimulated bilateral trade of the observed countries. Analysing the final 
stage of CEE countries on their path to EU membership, we concluded that the 
completion of trade integration in the EU lead to further increase of their bilateral 
exports to the EU. This trend is noted both in their trade with EU-15 and their 
intra-regional trade.
The results for WB countries indicate that trade integration with the EU has a 
positive effect on their trade. But, we have found out that greater positive effects 
on WB trade have been achieved during the first stages of their EU integration, 
when asymmetric trade preferences (ATMs) were applied, than in the later stages 
when SAA came into effect introducing symmetry, when no significant impact oc-
curred. This is due to the low international competitive position of WB economies 
vis-á-vis the EU as their main partners. As less competitive partners, WB countries 
enjoyed asymmetric trade benefits unilaterally granted by the EU, and SAA did 
not bring any new benefits in their trade with the EU. Even more, SAA introduced 
symmetrical trade preferences and forced WB countries to open their market to 
EU goods. Related to all this, our further analysis confirmed the increase in WB 
exports to CEE countries after their adoption of ATMs, as new EU members. Also, 
the opening of the WB markets towards CEE, with the application of SAA, created 
more favourable trade regime that boosted CEE exports toward these countries.
Concerning trade flows to non-EU markets, we found that CEFTA 2006 repre-
sents the highest contributing factor to WB intra-regional trade. This is expected 
since these countries are natural trade partners with convergent economies at the 
same level of competitiveness. Contrary to some other obstacles in their trade 
with the core EU members, like technical barriers to trade, fewer barriers are 
present in their intra-regional trade. Besides, trade relations between acceding 
countries before their EU membership were governed by a series of bilateral 
FTAs. The analysis showed that these trade regimes played an important role in 
determining the mutual trade of EU acceding countries. Since there were some 
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indications that the exchange rate substantially determined bilateral trade flows 
of the observed countries, our results confirm certain contribution, which, how-
ever, does not overshadow the trade regimes’ importance as the primary factor.
Our analysis demonstrates that trade regimes are important factors in deter-
mining trade flows, even when the real exchange rate is introduced as a deter-
minant. With the process of EU accession, the trade regime varies from asym-
metrical, in favour of acceding countries, to fully symmetrical at the moment 
when EU membership is achieved. However, these variations are not in line with 
the level of competitiveness of WB acceding countries. Being at a lower level of 
competitiveness, WB countries cannot fully stand the competitive pressure from 
the EU market. Therefore, apart from trade regime effects, the subject of our fu-
ture research could be the investigation of the effects of competitiveness on the 
exports of the WB countries. Furthermore, it will be interesting to observe the 
effects of exchange rate volatility rather than its value, which we observed. This 
is especially true for Serbia, where significant variation in exchange rate is noted, 
since most of the other WB countries have stable exchange rates, either Euro as a 
currency or some kind of currency board.
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